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Lawrence v. Texas: Does This Mean 
Increased Privacy Rights for Gay 
and Lesbian Teachers? 
Suzanne Eckes 
Martha McCarthy 
This article addresses the Supreme Court's 2003 decision in 
Lawrence v. Texas and its implications for the rights of gay and 
lesbian public school teachers. The authors provide a context by 
reviewing the teacher role-model theory, traditional standards used in 
dismissals for immoral conduct, and pre-Lawrence cases regarding 
public employees' privacy rights. Then they analyze Lawrence v. 
Texas, which struck down a Texas law imposing criminal penalties 
for persons of the same sex engaging in certain sexual conduct. The 
final section explores implications of the expanded liberty right 
announced in Lawrence for public school teachers and their lifestyle 
choices. 
Introduction 
There cannot be two sets of ethical principles, or two forms of ethical theory, 
one for life in the school and the other for life outside of the school, as conduct 
is one, the principles of conduct are also one. (Hooker, 1995, p. 3) 
Throughout history, teachers have been dismissed for immoral conduct that 
occurs both in and out of school. In the past, school authorities tried to 
discharge teachers because of pregnancy or even divorce (Littlejohn v. Rose, 
1985; Ponton v. Newport, 1986). School districts have also attempted to 
dismiss teachers because of their sexual orientation (Gaylord v. Tacoma, 
1977; Rowland v. Mad River School, 1984). Most states have statutes 
regulating the grounds for teacher dismissal, under which teachers may be 
dismissed for "immorality" or for the conviction of a crime including "moral 
turpitude." To the extent these statutes attempt to regulate teachers' private 
conduct, however, some questions remain as to whether these statutes violate 
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a teacher's constitutional right to privacy (Trebilcock, 2000). The Supreme 
Court's recent decision in Lawrence v. Texas (2003), although not 
specifically addressing the issue of teacher dismissal, may provide some 
insight and guidelines regarding a teacher's privacy rights. 
This article addresses the potential impact of the Lawrence v. Texas 
decision on gay and lesbian public school teachers. First, it provides a brief 
overview of how public school teachers have been considered role models 
for students and thus could be disciplined or dismissed for immoral 
conduct. Next, the paper explores pre-Lawrence cases regarding public 
employees' right to privacy. Finally, the article provides an analysis of the 
Lawrence v. Texas decision and discusses implications the decision may 
have for public school teachers. 
The Teacher as a Role Model for Students 
Throughout history, "the school teacher has traditionally been regarded as 
a moral example for the students" (Board of Education v. Wood, 1986, p. 
839). One court noted that "We are aware of the special position occupied 
by a teacher in our society. As a consequence of that elevated stature, a 
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teacher's actions are subject to much greater scrutiny than that given to the 
activities of the average person" (Chicago Board of Education v. Payne, 
1981, p. 748). As such, public school teachers are generally held to a 
higher standard of behavior than the general public because of their close 
relationships with students (Adams v. State Professional Practices Council, 
1981). In 1979, the Supreme Court observed: 
A teacher serves as a role model for his students, exerting a subtle but 
important influence over their perceptions and values. Thus, through both 
the presentation of course materials and the example he sets, a teacher has 
an opportunity to influence the attitudes of students toward government, 
the political process, and a citizen's social responsibilities. This influence 
is crucial to the continued good health of a democracy. (Ambach v. 
Norwick, 1979, p. 77) 
The standards to judge a teacher's private behavior have always varied 
across jurisdictions. Courts have taken the position that, although schools 
are designed to prepare students to participate in the national political and 
democratic process, they should also be a reflection of their communities. 
That is, the values a school chooses to embrace may very well depict the 
community in which the school is situated. Of course, this means that there 
is no single standard for assessing teacher conduct. It is also important to 
note that a community's standard cannot violate an individual's 
constitutional rights (Ambach v. Norwick, 1979). In other words, while a 
public school teacher may serve as a role model, it is well-settled law that 
the government may not require a teacher to shed his or her constitutional 
rights to retain a government position (Perry v. Sinderman, 1972). 
Immorality is a legitimate cause for dismissing a teacher, and in the past, 
gay and lesbian teachers' conduct has been considered immoral under 
some community standards (Walden & Culverhouse, 1989).1 The key issue 
in such cases is how far teachers' privacy rights extend. 
The Right To Privacy 
The individual's right to privacy has been recognized as far back as 1890. 
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis acknowledged the existence of a right 
to privacy when they helped to establish that each individual has a 
cognizable legal interest in a private life. For example, while on the 
Supreme Court, Justice Brandeis argued that the Fourth Amendment 
insures that the government does not intrude into the "privacy of the 
individual" (Trebilcock, 2000, p. 450). Justice Brandeis consistently took 
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the position that one's private life should be free from government 
intrusion. 
In addition to the Fourth Amendment argument supported by Justice 
Brandeis, the Fourteenth Amendment requires that "no person be deprived 
of life, liberty or property without due process of law" (U.S. Const. 
Amend. XIV, 1). Although the Constitution makes no direct reference to 
the existence of a right to privacy, it is a right implied in the concept of 
personal liberty embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment (Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, 1992).2 The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
Clause's substantive component derives mainly from the interpretation of 
the term "liberty." As a result, certain types of government limits on 
individual conduct have been held to unreasonably interfere with important 
individual rights to the extent that they amount to an unreasonable denial 
of "liberty." Accordingly, there are certain protected zones of privacy 
where the government should not interfere, regardless of the government 
interest asserted. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has extended this zone of privacy in several 
cases. In 1965, the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut allowed married 
couples access to contraception, and in 1972 it extended the ruling to 
unmarried couples in Eisenstadt v. Baird. In both Griswold and Eisenstadt, 
the Court recognized constitutional protection of a privacy right in private 
sexual activity. In 1973, the right of privacy was also articulated to protect 
a woman's right to have an abortion in Roe v. Wade. In contrast, a 1986 
decision, Bowers v. Hardwick, did not extend this privacy right to include 
all private sexual activity when the Supreme Court upheld a Georgia anti-
sodomy statute. 
Given this zone of privacy, the courts have attempted to balance the 
school board's interests in safeguarding the welfare of students and the 
teacher's right to privacy. For example, a teacher can be terminated based 
on evidence that would not be sufficient to support criminal charges, but 
teacher discipline or dismissal cannot occur solely because school officials 
disapprove of teachers' personal and private conduct (Montefusco v. 
Nassau County, 1999). Also, teachers cannot be dismissed for 
unsubstantiated rumors about their private activities (Peaster Independent 
School District v. Glodfelty, 2001). However, restrictions can be placed on 
unconventional behavior that is detrimental to job performance or harmful 
to students. 
Despite the guidance provided by the Supreme Court regarding privacy 
rights, public school teachers' privacy rights have not been clearly 
delineated, so teacher lifestyle cases have been decided on a case-by-case 
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basis. As such, school boards have continued to discipline or dismiss 
teachers for actions pertaining to their lives outside of the classroom, and 
in response, teachers have challenged school officials' authority to restrict 
personal lifestyle choices. 
Pre-Lawrence Decisions 
Prior to 2003, lower courts rendered a range of opinions regarding public 
employees' privacy rights. The recent trend has been to require a nexus 
between the lifestyle choice and ability to perform the job, but courts have 
differed in defining the type of nexus required. 
Cases Regarding Marriage and Pregnancy 
Lower courts have been reluctant to support dismissal actions based on 
marital status and pregnancy. The courts' reluctance has been based on 
their recognition that decisions pertaining to marriage and parenthood 
involve constitutionally protected privacy rights. To illustrate, the Fifth 
Circuit found a Mississippi school district's rule of prohibiting the 
employment of unwed parents to promote a "properly moral scholastic 
environment" to be a violation of equal protection and due process despite 
the school district's argument that unwed parents were improper 
communal role models (Andrews v. Drew, 1975, p. 614). Similarly, 
compelled leaves of absence for pregnant, unmarried employees have been 
invalidated as violating constitutional privacy rights. For example, at least 
one court has held that offering a teacher parental leave without guarantee 
of her position upon return violates the teacher's constitutional and 
statutory rights (Ponton v. Newport News School Board, 1986). 
Courts generally have also reasoned that public employees have a 
privacy right to engage in consenting sexual relationships regardless of 
their marital status; such relationships would have to impair teaching 
effectiveness to be the basis for dismissal. For example, the Supreme Court 
of Iowa held that a teacher's adulterous relationship provided insufficient 
grounds to justify revocation of his teaching certificate because the 
relationship did not severely impact his employment (Erb v. Iowa, 1974). 
The court noted that the mere fact that a teacher admitted adultery was not 
enough to prove his inability to teach. Specifically, the court reasoned that 
"the personal moral views of the board members cannot be relevant" (p. 
343). Similarly, a Florida court overturned a school board's termination of 
a teacher for lacking good moral character based on a personal romantic 
relationship (Sherburne v. School Board, 1984). The court held that the 
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teacher's cohabitation did not have an adverse effect on her ability to teach. 
Also, the Sixth Circuit ruled that a school board's nonrenewal of a 
teacher's contract based on her involvement in a divorce violated her 
constitutional privacy rights (Littlejohn v. Rose, 1985). In this case, the 
court disagreed with the parents who argued that there was disruption 
because there were too many divorced teachers teaching in the public 
school. In finding for the teacher, the court relied on the constitutional right 
to privacy that precludes dismissal of a teacher seeking divorce. 
Some courts, however, have upheld dismissals or other disciplinary 
actions based on public employees' adulterous relationships. In a non school 
case, the Fifth Circuit upheld disciplinary action against two police officers 
for their off-duty dating and alleged cohabitation (Shawgo v. Spradlin, 
1983). The court reasoned that the officer's conduct could bring public 
attention that could result in unfavorable criticism of the police department. 
Also, the Texas Supreme Court held that constitutional rights were not 
violated when a police officer was denied promotion for having an affair 
with another officer's wife (City of Sherman v. Henry, 1996). 
Cases Regarding Homosexuality 
When determining employment decisions based on a teacher's sexual 
orientation, the courts will generally consider the notoriety surrounding the 
conduct, whether the homosexual conduct was public or private in nature, 
and its overall impact on teaching abilities. Specifically, courts will require 
a nexus between private homosexuality and impaired teaching 
effectiveness in order justify dismissal. Of course, if teachers engage in 
public sexual activity whether homosexual or heterosexual, they can be 
dismissed for immorality (Morgan v. State Board of Education, 2002). 
Dismissals of public school employees based solely on sexual 
orientation, in the absence of criminal charges, have evoked a range of 
judicial interpretations (Boy Scouts of American v. Dale, 2000). The 
Morrison v. Board of Education (1969) and the Gaylord v. Tacoma (1977) 
decisions provide a partiCUlarly good illustration of the range of judicial 
interpretations in this area of law. In Morrison, a male teacher (Morrison) 
had a homosexual relationship with another public school teacher, 
Schneringer. A year after the consensual sexual relationship, Schneringer 
informed the district of their one-week long sexual relationship. Morrison 
resigned from his position and the State Board of Education later 
determined that the sexual incident "constituted immoral and 
unprofessional conduct, and an act involving moral turpitude, all of which 
warrant revocation of life diplomas" (p. 219). The Board's decision was 
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later overturned by the Supreme Court of California, which held that under 
the statute teachers could only be dismissed for immorality or moral 
turpitude if it rendered the individual unfit to teach. In so doing, the court 
ordered that Morrison's certificate be restored because the school board 
failed to demonstrate that Morrison was unfit to teach. The Supreme Court 
of California laid out the following set of guidelines to help determine 
when a teacher is unfit to teach: 
1. The likelihood that the conduct would adversely affect students or 
fellow teachers; 
2. The degree of such adversity anticipated; 
3. The proximity or remoteness in time of the conduct; 
4. The type of teaching certificate held by the party involved; 
5. The extenuating circumstance surrounding the conduct; 
6. The praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of the motives resulting 
in the conduct; 
7. The likelihood of the recurrence of the conduct; and 
8. The extent to which disciplinary action may inflict an adverse 
impact or chilling effect upon the constitutional rights of the 
teacher involved or other teachers. 
As such, the Morrison court held that when immorality is "used in a statute 
it is inseparable from 'conduct'" (p. 224) and that the conduct must 
adversely affect the teacher's fitness to perform. 
Contrary to the Supreme Court of California's decision in Morrison, 
the Supreme Court of Washington upheld a dismissal of a homosexual 
teacher based on mere knowledge of the teacher's sexual orientation in 
Gaylord v. Tacoma (1977). Gaylord had been a teacher for 12 years in 
Tacoma where he had received superior teaching evaluations. After his 
homosexuality became public knowledge, the school board argued that the 
students' knowledge of his sexual orientation would impair his ability to 
teach. The school cited fear, confusion, suspicion, and parental concern as 
justification of the dismissal. The Gaylord court agreed, holding that 
school boards need not wait for "overt expressions of homosexual conduct 
before they act to prevent harm" (p. 1347). Although the school failed to 
provide any evidence that the teacher's homosexuality would be disruptive 
in the classroom, the court reasoned that homosexuality is inherently 
immoral. Based on this conclusion, the court reasoned that public 
knowledge of a teacher's homosexual conduct could lead to notoriety of 
such a nature that the teacher could no longer perform classroom activities. 
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Similar to Gaylord, other courts have upheld dismissals based on mere 
knowledge of a teacher's homosexuality, which suggests that such 
knowledge is sufficient to establish an impairment of teaching 
effectiveness that overrides any protected privacy interest. Specifically in 
Sixth Circuit and Ninth Circuit cases, sexual orientation appeared to be the 
reason public educators were dismissed, despite the inability to show the 
required nexus of notoriety and classroom disruption. In Rowland v. Mad 
River Local School District (1984), a guidance counselor's contract was 
not renewed after she revealed her sexual orientation to adult employees at 
the school. The Sixth Circuit found that because she did not have tenure, 
there was no expectancy of employment and her dismissal was upheld. In 
an earlier case, Burton v. Cascade School District (1975), a non-tenured 
teacher was dismissed after adult school employees learned of the teacher's 
sexual orientation. The Ninth Circuit did not reinstate Burton for the same 
reason mentioned in Rowland. 
The Tenth Circuit upheld an Oklahoma statute that allowed school 
boards to terminate teachers for engaging in public homosexual activity 
(National Gay Task Force v. Board of Education, 1984). The court, 
however, did find the part of the statute that allowed "punishment" of 
teachers for public homosexual conduct to be unconstitutional. 
Additionally, the court struck down the portion of the law authorizing the 
dismissal or nonrenewal of teachers for advocating public or private 
homosexuality; this part of the statute was found overbroad because it 
sought to regulate free speech rights. Finally, the court noted that under the 
statute, the school district would be required to show a connection between 
the teacher's ability to teach and the teacher's speech. In another case, a 
New York federal court upheld the termination of a teacher for actively 
participating in the North American ManIBoy Love Association 
(NAMBLA), a group supporting consensual sexual activity between men 
and boys. The court reasoned that the teacher's activities in NAMBLA 
were likely to impair his effectiveness as a teacher and would cause 
internal disruption in the classroom (Melzer v. Board of Education, 2002). 
Likewise, in other recent lower court cases, the judicial decisions have 
been mixed. For example, the Utah Federal District Court held that the 
community's negative reaction to a teacher's homosexuality did not justify 
the removal of the teacher as the girl's volleyball coach. The court also 
held that the school district could not instruct her not to mention her 
"homosexual orientation or lifestyle" to students, parents, or staff (Weaver 
v. Nebo School District, 1998, p. 1285). The Court noted that the teacher's 
homosexuality and the community's negative response to it did not furnish 
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a rational job-related basis for her removal. Also, when an Ohio federal 
court found that a teacher was not renewed because of his sexual 
orientation rather than for his teaching deficiencies as the school board 
asserted, the court awarded the teacher reinstatement, back pay, and 
damages (Glover v. Williamsburg, 1998). 
In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit upheld revocation ofa public 
employee's job offer after her employer, the Attorney General of the State 
of Georgia, learned of the employee's upcoming same-sex marriage. The 
employment action was based on her illegal wedding ceremony rather than 
the fact that she was a lesbian. The attorney general contended that the 
same-sex marriage would interfere with the inability to enforce the state's 
sodomy law and would create an appearance of conflicting interpretations 
of state law. The employee brought an action claiming violation of her 
rights of intimate and expressive association, freedom of religion, equal 
protection and substantive due process. The court found that the interests 
of the employer outweighed the employee's constitutional interests 
(Shahar v. Bowers, 1997). Specifically, the court reasoned that the position 
required that the attorney exercise good judgment and needed to maintain 
her employer's trust. The attorney general argued that the plaintiff's 
intimate associational rights were subordinate to the employer's interest in 
the effective functioning of the government office. 
As mentioned, prior to 2003, the Supreme Court had rendered only one 
decision pertaining to private sexual activity involving sodomy. In Bowers 
v. Hardwick (1986), a Georgia law criminalizing public or private 
consensual sodomy resulted in a widely publicized decision. In this case, 
an individual challenged the law's constitutionality after being criminally 
charged for committing sodomy with an adult male in the privacy of his 
home. The Court in a five-to-four ruling found a rational basis in 
legislation reflecting the citizenry's view that sodomy is immoral and 
unacceptable. Declaring that homosexuals have no constitutional right to 
engage in sodomy, the Court majority focused its opinion on the 
homosexual nature of the conduct at issue, even though the law's 
prohibition applies to heterosexual sodomy as well. In upholding sodomy 
laws, the Court also noted that there is no American tradition of accepting 
homosexual conduct. In so doing, the Court did not hold that 
homosexuality was a crime or that homosexuality was immoral, only that 
the sexual conduct could be prohibited. Given this holding, states could 
continue to use certain conduct, such as sodomy, as a ground for dismissal 
of public employees, including teachers (Walden & Culverhouse, 1989). 
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This decision was relied on as precedent until 2003, even though criminal 
sanctions for private sodomy have not generally been enforced. 
Lawrence v. Texas: Increased Privacy Rights for 
Homosexuals 
In 2003 the Supreme Court rendered a significant decision in Lawrence v. 
Texas, striking down a Texas law that imposed criminal penalties if two 
persons of the same sex engage in certain sexual conduct. The state appeals 
court had found Bowers controlling in rejecting a Fourteenth Amendment 
challenge to the law by two men who were arrested and convicted of 
deviate sexual intercourse in violation of the Texas law. 
The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that the law violated the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Disagreeing with the 
conclusion of the Bowers Court and its failure to comprehend the scope of 
the individual liberty interest involved, the Lawrence majority (2003) 
noted that the Texas law touches on the most private area of human 
behavior-sexual conduct-in the most private place, one's home. In 
overturning Bowers, the Court clearly enunciated that private, consensual 
sexual behavior in the privacy of the home is constitutionally protected and 
cannot be the basis for a crime. The Court found that "adults may choose 
to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own 
private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons" (Lawrence v. 
Texas, 2003, p. 2478). The Court declared that "Bowers was not correct 
when it was decided, and it is not correct today" (p. 2484). 
The Court majority reviewed the Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe cases 
which, as discussed, found protected liberty rights under the Due Process 
Clause in areas such as marriage, procreation, and child rearing. 
Specifically, the Court noted that the "pertinent beginning point" for its 
holding in Lawrence was Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) and recognized 
that after Griswold, the right to make decisions regarding sexual conduct 
extends beyond the marital relationship. In discussing Eisenhardt, the 
Court reiterated that "if the right of privacy means anything, it is the right 
of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted 
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as 
the decision whether to bear or beget a child" (Lawrence v. Texas, 2003, p. 
2477). The Lawrence majority noted that these cases provided the context 
for the widely publicized decision legalizing abortions, Roe v. Wade 
(1973). The Court also cited its 1977 ruling striking down a New York law 
forbidding the distribution of contraceptives to persons under 16 years of 
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age as support for the principle that Fourteenth Amendment liberty rights 
extend beyond the rights of married adults (Carey v. Population Services 
International, 1977). 
In 2003, only 13 states had laws criminalizing sodomy, whereas 25 
states had such laws at the time of Bowers, and all 50 states outlawed 
sodomy as late as 1961 (Lawrence v. Texas, 2003, p. 2474). Yet, at the 
time of the Lawrence ruling, just four states enforced their laws solely 
against homosexual conduct. 
The Lawrence majority cited two post-Bowers cases as eroding the 
foundation of the Bowers holding. Reaffirming the right to have an 
abortion, the Court observed in Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) that 
"matters involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may 
make in a lifetime ... are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment" (p. 851). The Court subsequently struck down an amendment 
to Colorado's Constitution that deprived a class of citizens who were 
homosexuals, lesbians, or bisexual any protections under state 
antidiscrimination laws (Romer v. Evans, 1996). The Lawrence majority 
also noted that the European Court of Human Rights had invalidated laws 
proscribing private, consensual homosexmil conduct under the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 
In addition to relying on prior case law regarding privacy rights, the 
Court also discussed the historical evolution of sodomy prohibitions when 
it overruled Bowers. In so doing, the Lawrence Court concluded that the 
Court in Bowers overstated the historical grounds for prohibiting 
homosexual conduct. The Court reasoned that there was no prohibition of 
sodomy during colonial times and that it was not until the late Nineteenth 
Century that the concept of homosexuality became a distinct category. 
From a historical perspective, American sodomy law was used to prohibit 
nonprocreative sexual activity generally rather than only homosexual 
activity. The Court further noted that laws prohibiting sodomy do not seem 
to have been enforced against consenting adults in private. This historical 
perspective is contrary to the Bowers holding, which indicated that there 
was no American tradition of accepting sodomy. 
Justice O'Connor concurred that the Texas law should be invalidated, 
but she disagreed that Bowers should be overruled (Lawrence v. Texas, 
2003). She based her conclusion that the Texas law should be struck down 
on the Equal Protection Clause, since the Texas law banned only same-sex 
sodomy. She concluded that moral disapproval is not a legitimate state 
interest to justify bans on homosexual, but not heterosexual, sodomy. 
Although indicating support for a "more searching form of rational basis 
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review" under the Equal Protection Clause, she found that the Texas law 
could not withstand scrutiny under the lenient rational basis standard (p. 
2485). She noted that when the state criminalizes conduct that is part of the 
homosexual lifestyle, homosexual persons become vulnerable to 
government discrimination in all aspects of their lives. While the Lawrence 
majority recognized that the equal protection argument was tenable, it 
chose Due Process grounds. If the Court deemed homosexuality a suspect 
class, the protections would be very broad in that any governmental action 
based on an individual's sexual orientation would be subject to the highest 
level of judicial scrutiny. 
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, 
devoted much of his lengthy dissent to arguing that if the majority's 
reasoning is valid in overturning Bowers-this justification should be 
applied to overturn Roe v. Wade as well. Indeed, he argued that overturning 
Bowers is a "massive disruption of the current social order," whereas 
overruling Roe would not be as it would simply return the decision on 
legalizing abortions to the states where it was prior to Roe (Lawrence v. 
Texas, 2003, p. 2491). He further noted that all laws reflect essentially 
moral choices, and asserted that laws against bigamy, same-sex marriages, 
prostitution, and many other crimes would be vulnerable to attack under 
the majority's reasoning. According to Justice Scalia, only fundamental 
rights "deeply rooted in the nation's history and tradition" (p. 2489) should 
be subjected to more than rational basis scrutiny under the substantive due 
process doctrine. Like many other laws regulating sexual behavior, Justice 
Scalia argued that the Texas law had a rational basis and should have been 
upheld. 
He contended that the Lawrence ruling cannot be reconciled with 
federal policy requiring the discharge of members of the armed forces that 
engage in homosexual acts or with the Supreme Court's decision holding 
that the Boy Scouts have a constitutional right to prohibit homosexuals 
from becoming Scout leaders (10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(I), 2003; Boy Scouts of 
American v. Dale, 2000). Interestingly, in lamenting the far reaching 
implications of the Lawrence ruling, Justice Scalia built a strong case to 
support the future use of the majority's rationale to legalize same-sex 
marriages. He asserted that if moral disapproval of homosexual conduct 
cannot justify the Texas law, then what justification could there possibly be 
for denying the benefits of marriage to homosexual couples exercising "the 
liberty protected by the Constitution" (p. 2498)? 
Justice Thomas endorsed Justice Scalia's dissent, but wrote separately. 
He felt that the Texas legislature should repeal the "silly" law (Lawrence v. 
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Texas, 2003, p. 2498). However, without such legislative action, he found 
nothing in the Constitution that created a general right of privacy that 
would invalidate the Texas law. 
Implications 
The Lawrence decision has recognized a new zone of privacy. Before 
Lawrence, engaging in sodomy was illegal in some states, so arguably a 
teacher's conduct in this regard could be considered immoral. Thus, the 
most obvious implication of the Lawrence decision would be that because 
it is no longer illegal for consenting adults to engage privately in sodomy, 
teachers will no longer be dismissed for such "criminal conduct." Before 
Lawrence, schools would attempt to strike a balance between the teacher's 
privacy rights and the interests of the school. As such, a less obvious 
implication relates to the question of whether the employers' interests can 
outweigh constitutional privacy rights of homosexual employees after 
Lawrence? 
In lower court teacher lifestyle cases, the courts have required schools 
to demonstrate a "nexus" in that the teacher's behavior must adversely 
affect the school or reduce teaching effectiveness in the classroom before 
sanctions can be imposed (Golden v. Board of Education, 1981; Jefferson 
Union v. Jones, 1972; Waugh v. Board of Cabell County, 1986). Courts 
have found a nexus to justify adverse action if the two following 
circumstances are met: (a) the conduct directly affects the performance of 
the responsibilities of the teacher; or (b) if, without contribution on the part 
of school officials, the conduct becomes the subject of such notoriety as to 
significantly impair the ability of the teacher to discharge the 
responsibilities of the teaching position (Jerry v. Board of Education, 
1974). Under this standard, evidence of a substantial 'community outcry' 
can provide the required nexus to dismiss the teacher if the notoriety 
impacts teaching abilities (Sullivan v. Meade, 1976). 
The Lawrence ruling raises questions about the continued vitality of 
these earlier decisions, given the Court's recognition of increased privacy 
rights. In other words, could a teacher still be dismissed if the school 
demonstrates this causal nexus? For example, if a teacher appears on a 
national talk show promoting her lesbian lifestyle and her community 
believes that she is unfit to teach because of her recent notoriety-what 
would be the result in light of Lawrence? Justice Kennedy wrote for the 
Lawrence majority that the "central holding in Bowers ... demeans the 
lives of homosexual persons" (p. 2482). Arguably, after Lawrence, even if 
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a nexus exists, the teacher should not be dismissed in this situation, as it 
would demean the life a lesbian teacher and invade her privacy. 
Yet, the Court in Lawrence did not directly address the issue of a 
nexus and disruption in the workplace, so additional litigation will be 
necessary to identify the type of impact on teaching effectiveness and 
school operations necessary to justify disciplinary action. Despite this 
silence in Lawrence, perhaps lower courts will be reluctant to support 
dismissal actions based on notoriety involving sexual orientation in the 
same way the courts have been reluctant to support dismissal actions based 
on marital status and pregnancy. Gay and lesbian teachers are more 
optimistic than they were prior to Lawrence regarding the potential success 
of legal challenges to employment decisions based on their sexual 
orientation, but it remains to be seen how lower courts will interpret the 
scope oftheir constitutionally protected privacy rights. 
Notes 
1 In a 1999 public opinion poll parents were asked if "school boards ought to have 
the right to fire teachers who are known homosexuals." Twenty percent of the 
parents completely agreed, 12% mostly agreed, 26% agreed, 36% completely 
disagreed, and 6% did not know (Public Opinion Online, 1999). 
2 After Casey, a woman still has a constitutionally protected privacy interest in 
choosing to have an abortion; however, the state has the right to regulate the 
abortion process. Such regulations may not place an undue burden on the 
woman. 
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